Why does climate change continue to be a forceful idea which divides people? What does this tell us about science, about culture and about the future? Despite disagreement, how might the idea of climate change nevertheless be used creatively? In this essay I develop my investigation of these questions using four lines of argument. First, the future risks associated with human-caused climate change are severely underdetermined by science. Scientific predictions of future climates are poorly constrained; even more so the consequences of such climates for evolving human socio-technological and natural ecosystems. Second, I argue that to act politically in the world people have to pass judgements on the facts of science; facts do not speak for themselves. Third, because these judgements are different, the strategic goals of policy interventions developed in response to risks associated with future climate change are inevitably multiple and conflicting. Finally, reconciling and achieving diverse goals requires political contestation. 'Moving forward' on climate change then becomes a task of investing in the discursive and procedural preconditions for an agonistic politics to work constructively, to enable ways of implementing policies when people disagree. 
Introduction
Climate change is an environmental, cultural and political phenomenon which is reshaping the way people think about themselves, their societies and their Earthly futures. It is therefore an exemplar case of scientific knowledge, personal experience and the human imagination interacting in multiple, complex and changing social contexts. As Lucien Boia observes in his book Weather in the Imagination, "Global warming and global cooling are physical phenomenon. But the battle over these real or presumed developments is a cultural and social phenomenon. In this sense at least, history and meteorology go hand-inhand" (Boia 2005, 181) . For example, the idea of climate change has provoked the emerging narrative of the Anthropocene -which posits a new geological era in which human actions have become dominant in planetary functioning. In this narrative, the long-standing separation in western thought of nature from culture is no longer tenable.
In Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (Hulme 2009) , I considered the different ways people think about, and act in response to, climate change in the context of science, economics, religion, fear, risk, development and politics. I argued that the idea of climate change mobilises very different meanings, ideologies, values and goals ... "it means different things to different people in different contexts, places and networks" (p.325). That book was written during the winter of 2007/8 and in the eight years since then many things have changed in the cultural politics of climate change. But my key argument remains valid: it is necessary to reveal the underlying reasons for disagreement about how to act in response to climate change before it is possible to find constructive ways of acting politically in the world. In this essay I want to pursue this investigation further by asking, and seeking to answer, these questions: Why does climate change continue to be a forceful idea which divides people and what does this tell us about science, about culture and about the future? What does climate change mean to different people? Despite disagreement, how might the idea of climate change nevertheless be used creatively to enact change?
The anthropologist Michael Dove has argued that climatic and human agency have historically been understood not as two separate domains with one causing or shaping the other (Dove 2015) . Rather, for much of cultural history and in most places climate and human agency have been understood to be co-dependent. Agency to shape the future is distributed between climate and humans; neither climate nor humans are in charge. The idea of human-caused climate change -and its progeny, the idea of the Anthropocene --has (in the enlightened west) reacquainted citizens with the unavoidable intimacy they have with the weather. If true, it means that any account of future climate given by merely scientific inquiry can never be complete since human actions are always imaginatively and morally reflexive. Merely constructing scientific truth or establishing expert consensus about the biogeophysics of the climate system is too limited a basis for acting in the world (Rescher 1993) .
I develop my investigation along four lines. First, the future risks associated with humancaused climate change are severely underdetermined by science. Although scientific inquiry has revealed humans as now powerful actors in influencing the climate system, scientific predictions of future climates are poorly constrained. Even less constrained are the consequences of these climates for evolving human socio-technological and natural ecosystems. Second, following Hannah Arendt (1958) , I argue that people have to pass judgements on facts before they can act politically in the world. Facts do not speak for themselves, least of all the underdetermined facts of the climatic and human future. Third, because people judge the facts of climate change in different ways, the strategic goals of policy interventions developed in response to the putative risks associated with future climate change are inevitably multiple and conflicting. They are shaped by different worldviews, different ethical systems and different accounts of good human living. And then, finally, how these diverse goals are achieved -the specific policies and human actions that materialise in specific societies -remain politically contested. These policies and actions reflect diverse values about what is at stake and different preferences for who is licenced to act. 'Moving forward' on climate change then becomes a task of investing in discursive and procedural pre-conditions for an agonistic politics to work constructively, to enable ways of implementing policies when people disagree.
The Risks of Climate Change are Underdetermined
Scientific inquiry never yields the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Least of all can it do so with respect to the future. The future, singular, is inaccesible to human minds because our knowledge of the outcome of interacting physical processes is deficient. But it is also underdetermined because of human agency: the mere act of imagining a possible future changes the likelihood and character of the future thus imagined. Despite the heroic efforts of many climate change researchers and international knowledge assessments such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this remains inescapably the case with regard to the climatic future. The scientific consensus on climate change thus becomes unhelpfully limiting. The "97.1% consensus" that has been widely circulated (e.g. Cook et al. 2013) , is a consensus regarding only the extent of the belief among relevant experts that humans are exerting a significant influence on the climate system. The future risks for society and ecology resulting from this influence are known by experts and analysts much more diffusely. I have written elsewhere about the dangers of climate reductionism (Hulme 2011) , about the dangers of elevating climate as a predictor of future social and ecological change without appreciating the deep contingency of these changes. The most that can safely be stated is that human actions on the atmosphere are changing existing environmental and social risks and introducing new ones.
The language of risk is one that the IPCC adopted more explicitly in its 5th Assessment Report, especially in its Working Group 2 volume on impacts and adaptation options (IPCC 2015a,b) . Chris Field, the co-Chair of this Working Group, explained one of the consequences of this linguistic move: "Characterising climate change as a challenge in managing risks opens doors to a wide range of options for solutions" (Field, quoted in Painter 2015, 286) . This is because the idea of 'risk' --with its attendant uncertainties and subjectivities --opens the space for different ethical, political and economic judgements to be made about different courses of action to ameliorate or tolerate these risks. The language of risk also challenges the univocal narrative of climate change ('the plan' as articulated by Sarewitz, 2011) as being partial at best, unhelpful at worst. Since the risks of future climate change are underdetermined, and how those risks are interpreted and acted upon is plural, we begin to see why climate change means different things for different people in different places, indeed why it must do so. Masking such differences by repeatedly emphasising the limited -limited in epistemic extent rather than depthscientific consensus is unhelpful (Hulme 2015a) .
Passing Judgement on the Facts
'Nature' should never be our moral or political guide, as is clear for example in relation to sexual or development ethics. Quite apart from philosophical objections to such a position 1 , since human actions are increasingly re-shaping bodily and planetary natures, there is no 'nature' which is itself free from human agency (Albertson & King 2010 ). Yet even if there were, simply knowing 'the facts' of climate change would be insufficient to inspire or determine political action in the world. The former Chairman of the IPCC, R K Pachauri, was profoundly wrong when he claimed in November 2014 at the launch of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC's 5th Assessment that, "All we need is the will to change, which we trust will be motivated by … an understanding of the science of climate change" (IPCC 2014 ' (2015) .
Given that climate change induces multiple meanings it is perhaps fruitful to think of the phrase 'climate change' as a synedoche; i.e., as replacive speech in which a part stands for a whole (as in 'fifty sail' for 'fifty ships') or vice versa (as in 'society' for 'high society'). So what things, what ideas, might climate change 'stand for'? Out of a much large array of possibilites let me suggest here just four.
Climate change stands for 'risk society'
Taking inspiration from the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, this modernist reading of climate change places it as a future risk which disciplines the present. Both authors approach climate change firmly from the perspective of modernity and the idea that today's societies, unlike preceding ones, live in the future rather than in the past. For Giddens, a risk society is one which becomes preoccupied with future risk and concerned with how such speculative risks can be tamed and safely navigated in the present. Ulrich Beck explains, "Risk society means that the past is losing its power of determination of the present. It is being replaced by the future, that is to say, something non-existent, fictitious and constructed, as the basis for present-day action … Expected risks are the whip to keep the present in line. The more threatening the shadows that fall on the present because a terrible future is impending, the more believed are the headlines provoked by the dramatisation of risk today" (Beck 1997, 20) .
Climate change with its future drama and 'threatening shadows' works precisely to exert such a hold on the present. Climate risks become mediatised (Weingart et al. 2000) ; climate change becomes an imagined spectacle which appears to 'demand' new techno-economic instruments of risk management.
Climate change stands for 'capitalism'
A different reading of climate change is to understand it as a decisive weapon to use in an ideological struggle. 
Climate change stands for 'lost nature'
A third meaning of climate change is that is stands for a lost nature. Bill McKibbin's bestselling book 'The End of Nature' (McKibbin 1989) was an early and prominent articulation of this narrative with respect to climate change, but it is a narrative which has deep resonance across many cultures (Rudiak-Gould 2012; Haluza-Delay 2014). The Edenic myth is a lament for a lost order and stability to a natural (and maybe God-given) world. Climate change eats away at the material foundations of a utopian future, a sentiment captured by Boia, "The history of humanity is characterised by an endemic anxiety … it is as if something or someone is remorselessly trying to sabotage the world's driving force -and particularly its climate" (Boia 2005, 149) . It is the same anxiety as echoed in this lament from the UK's Camp for Climate Action (2008), "Not long ago we knew the best time for planting seeds … when the leaves would turn deep orange, when to look forward to building snowmen. Things like the cuckoo's dependable call would be a sign that spring had come. There was a kind of certainty to our lives ... But the cuckoo's are disappearing and it seems all the patterns of the world are being scrambled ... For the first time in human history the ability of our planet's ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted."
Climate change therefore unsettles what had been presumed to be settled, whether that be a particular set of climatic conditions (Hulme 2015b) or an assumed purity or separateness of the natural world beyond the reach of humans. This way of making sense of climate change, of giving it meaning, resonates with the idea of 'things falling apart' which Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe explored -in a different context -in his eponymous best-selling post-colonial novel set in West Africa (Achebe 1965) . And it is reflected too in The Dark Mountin Project, a UK-based cultural movement triggered by the negotiating failures of COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. In the words of joint founder Paul Kingsnorth (undated), "Dark Mountain became a wider cultural movement of people who had stopped believing in the conventional narratives about the future, and who wanted to start unweaving some of the myths of human centrality; of our separation from something called 'Nature'; of endless progress; of our ability to control the Earth."
Climate change stands for 'the Anthropocene'
A fourth synedoche for climate change is to see it standing in for the larger (and more ambiguous) idea of the Anthropocene. This proposed new epoch is one in which the collective force of human activities remakes the physical world and leaves ineradicable traces in geological strata; in the words of one recent review, "Human actvity is now global and is the dominant cause of most contempoerary environmental change" (Lewis & Maslin 2015, 171) . With climate change as a synedoche for the Anthropocene it becomes an idea which reveals the changed relationship between humans and nature, an idea which "invites techno-managerial planning and expert administration at the expense of democratric debate and contestation" (Lövbrand et al. 2015, 217 ). Yet there are many different Anthropocenes to be imagined. For some, climate change offers the hope of a 'brave new world' and the prospects of a 'Great Anthropocene' (EcoModernist Manifesto 2015) and for others the possibilities of a 'Charming Anthropocene' (Buck 2015) . For others still, climate change signals the first moves into dangerous 'operating space' for humanity (Rockström et al. 2009 ).
Multiple and Conflicting Goals
With the facts of climate change judged in these and other ways, it becomes clearer to see the range of preferred courses of action to be pursued. Out of these different meanings, these different narratives of what climate change stands for, emerge multiple and often conflicting goals. The goals of 'action' on climate change might therefore be, inter alia, to limit global warming to two degrees, to deliver creation care, to design a planetary thermostat, to transform civilisation or to safeguard economic growth --or indeed to secure fair growth, zero growth or de-growth. All of these goals have prima facie credibility since they emerge from different readings of what climate change is about, inspired by different cosmologies and ethical or political values. They emerge from different judgements being passed on the facts. Far from their being the possibility of a singular 'decisive political action' on climate change, the strategic goals of policy interventions are inevitably multivariate because they are shaped by different worldviews and different narratives of good human living.
It is for this reason that Luers and Sklar (2014, 114) declare that ".. the focus on a single target [two degrees of warming] has become an obstacle [to effective policy-making] because it ... frames climate change as a distant abstract threat and fails to recognise the diversity of values and risk perceptions of people around the world." This, too, is the position taken by Victor and Kennel (2014) in their argument for moving away from a singular climate policy target in favour of a basket of goals, a strategy of multiple goalseeking. Climate risks have to be contextualised alongside other risk and welfare issues, for example as articulated in the multiple objectives of the newly negotiated Sustainable Development Goals. This move away from climate exceptionalism was evident in the framing of some of the chapters in the IPCC's 5th Assessment Working Group 2 Report (IPCC 2015a,b) .
Using Politics to Move Forward
So, in the light of such diversity and plurality what way forward? One way is the programme of global environmental visioning -under the rubric 'the future we want' -that has been developed for the United Nations. This initiative, emerging from the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, aims to gather "... priorities of people from every corner of the world, [to] ... build a collective vision that will be used directly by the UN and World Leaders to plan a new development agenda launching in 2015, one that is based on the aspirations of all citizens!" (Beyond2015 2014 . But can a 'collective vision' based on the 'aspirations of all citizens' really be constructed? In their analysis of a similar global visioning process conducted by the Danish Government in 2009 in the run-up to COP15 in Copenhagen, Blue and Medlock (2014) identify the dangers of such ambition. Their careful analysis of the framings and citizen engagements used in this process concluded that it is essential to maintain diversity of meanings and plurality of visions in such dialogues: "... the more universal and standardized scientific discourse becomes for global policy purposes, the more responsive formal participatory initiatives should be to diverse public meanings" (p.576). A singular 'future' imagined by a collective 'we' is an unachievable goal.
Neither, I suggest, is the way forward simply an endorsement of the types of elitist proclamation about 'what must be done', such as the one released by the Earth League on Earth Day in April 2015 (Earth League 2015) . This self-selecting group of 18 leading academics and environmental scientists offered the world's governments, meeting in Paris at COP21 later in 2015, 'eight essential elements of climate action'. They were clear in the definitive necessity of what had to be done, using phrases such as 'The carbon budget must ...', 'We need to …', 'Every country must ...', 'We must unleash …', 'We must safeguard sinks …', 'We must realise …' It may be the case that these particular 18 scientists "speak with one voice" (quoted in Rockstrom et al. 2015, 607 , another article taking inspiration from the Earth League), but as I have shown above the world does not.
Both of these examples of 'ways forward' end up suppressing the sheer diversity and proliforation of meanings and goals that gain inspiration from the idea of climate change. They end up short-circuiting political processes of opening-up, contest and negotiation in the name of (scientific) necessity. Instead, I suggest a different way forward: to invest intellectual, political and social capital in establishing the following four pre-conditions for recognising and handling such plurality in relation to climate change. This manifesto is, of course, as with the Earth League, an expression of my own normative position. It does not emerge from 'an understanding of the science of climate change' nor from some bottom-up process of collective global visioning. And it doesn't jump into declaring what the world's governments 'must' do. Instead, it draws attention to the importance of appropriate modes of proceedure.
First, science needs to be put in its place. As I have argued, scientific knowledge about climate change will never be decisive in providing the will to change nor in adjudicating what should be done in response to the risks: "Science must be part of the democratic process and not a substitute for it" (Krauss 2014, 74) . For climate change this implies a shift in perspective. Scientific knowledge, least of all consual knowledge, is not in the foreground. Pope Francis' recent Encyclical, 'On Care for our Common Home', is a good example of being respectful to science, but not being obedient to it.
Second, the proliforation of diverse and inspiring narratives and meanings surrounding the idea of climate change needs encouragement. Such narratives gain inspiration and give expression to more deeply held human beliefs and values which offer the promise of the "full moral voice" the lack of which was lamented by Naomi Klein (Klein 2014) . This would include re-animating religious myths and stories which can expand cultural repertoiresfinding new stories through which to 'pass judgement' on the facts of climate change. As Clingerman (2015) argues, given the salience of religion and religious institutions across the world, religious voices need to be heard in this public conversation (cf. Mendieta & Vanantwerpen 2011). Again, the 2015 Papal Encyclical is a good example (Pope Francis 2015).
Third, investment should be made in strengthening forms of political representation which are able to function under conditions of deep conflict -both at state level, but also above and below the state. Living with climate change is nothing less than living in an agonistic democracy, in which those whose preferred policy options are rejected by political power nevertheless acquiesce in decisions because their voice has been heard (Rescher 1993) . It is crucial to cultivate adequate spaces of public encounter and listening beyond the echochambers and information cocoons of the internet and digital social media (Sunstein 2009 ). The conditions that make political judgement possible --trust in institutions, accountable power, respect for contrary opinions, legitimate forms of representation -cultivate an agonisitic politics and an acquiescent polity (Mouffe 2005) .
Fourth, I suggest that investment is needed in the cultivation of virtuous citizens, citizens who act resolutely in the world from a sense of appropriate purpose. This is an argument I have made esewhere with respect to climate change (Hulme 2014) and one that is echoed in other recent work. Di Paola (2015) , for example, draws attention to the virtues of mindfulness and cheerfulness in the Anthropocene, for him given expresson through the cultivation of 'urban gardens', while Stirling (2015) calls for mutual relations of 'care' over the domineering rhetoric of 'control'.
The goals of climate policy interventions matter, yes. And these need clear articulation, drawing upon the range of cultural beliefs and political values that are held between and within our societies. In a healthy democracy it is necessary to expose this diversity of goals; and reconciling conflicting goals is what politics is for. But the most precious investment is to lay down the right conditions for how people wish to live and decide together, agonistically, in democratic societies. This is to establish a secure and rightful basis for how politics is to work, for how the powerful are to be held accountable and the powerless to be heard. Ends matter, but so too do means. We can neither predict nor control what the outcome of these political conditions and human virtues will be. But then neither can global climate be controlled nor climate change solved. It is not that sort of phenomnon.
